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Roll Up the Constitution and Unfurl the TARP:
How Spending Conditions in the Troubled Asset
Relief Program Violate the Constitution
David T Riley'
INTRODUCTION
We accept the verdict of the past until the need for change cries out loudly
enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts of further inertia
and the irksomeness of action.
- Judge Learned Hand'
T ESTIFYING before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States
Congress in September of 2008, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the
Federal Reserve, declared:
Despite the efforts by the Federal Reserve, the [U.S.] Treasury, and
other agencies, global financial markets remain under extraordinary stress.
Action by the Congress is urgently required to stabilize the situation and
avert what otherwise could be very serious consequences for our financial
markets and for our economy.
... [SItabilization of our financial system is an essential precondition for
economic recovery. I urge the Congress to act quickly to address the grave
threats to financial stability that we currently face.3
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Henry Paulson, spoke more bluntly on
the subject. In front of the Senate Banking Committee he warned:
As we've worked through this period of market turmoil, we have acted
i J.D., expected December 2010, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.A., ex-
pected May 2010, University of Kentucky Patterson School of Diplomacy & International
Commerce; B.A., May 2007, Economics and Spanish Language & Literature, magna cum laude,
Transylvania University.
2 JOHN COOK, BOOK OF POSITIVE QUOTATIONS 399 (Steve Deger & Leslie Ann Gibson
eds., Fairview Press 2d ed. 1997) (1993).
3 The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before theJ. Econ. Comm., I Ioth Cong. 15, 18 (2oo8) [here-
inafter The Economic Outlook] (statement of Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-i Ioshrg84S/
pdf/CHRG-i ioshrg845.pdf.
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on a case-by-case basis . .. . We have also taken a number of powerful
tactical steps to increase confidence in the system .... These steps have
been necessary but not sufficient.
More is needed. . . .We must now take further, decisive action to
fundamentally and comprehensively address the root cause of this
turmoil.'
Senator Charles Schumer captured the meaning behind these words best,
saying, "[Chairman Bernankel told us that our American economy's arteries,
our financial system, is [sic] clogged, and if we don't act, the patient will
surely suffer a heart attack, maybe next week, maybe in six months, but it
will happen."'
These sobering statements concerning the health of the U.S. economy
and financial system were the result of an avalanche of negative economic
news. The current financial crisis was precipitated by the September 15,
2008, bankruptcy of U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers,6 a dramatic
decline in equity values on Wall Street,7 increased job losses on Main
Street,' a steep and sweeping recession, 9 and other economic conditions
4 Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't Office Pub. Affairs, Testimony by Secretary Henry
M. Paulson, Jr. Before the Senate Banking Committee on Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets:
Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other
Financial Institutions [hereinafter Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets], available at http://bank-
ing.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-id=0 4 ba22 4 a-4 cee-
463e-bi d8-ocd 7 7 e85bd4.
5 America' Bail-Out Plan: The Doctors' Bill, 'ME ECONOMIST, Sept. 27-Oct. 3, 2oo8, at 81,
81.
6 See Andrew R. Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Ai (summarizing events surrounding the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers and other financial turmoil on Wall Street); see also Press Release, Lehman Brothers,
Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc. Announces It Intends to File Chapter i I Bankruptcy Petition
(Sept. 15, ioo8), http://www.lehman.com/press/pdfL2oo8/o915o8_lbhi chapters 1_announce.
pdf (official press release detailing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers).
7 See Stephen Labaton, Wall St. in Worst Loss Since 'oi Despite Reassurances by Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16,2 oo8, at AI (describing how the decline in the Dow Jones industrial average
after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was the worst one-day decline on the New York Stock
Exchange since the terrorist attacks on Sept. II, 2001).
8 See Press Release, The Employment Situation-August 2009, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 4, 2009, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ar-
chives/empsit.o9o42oo9.pdf (confirming that since the current recession began in December
of 2007, the U.S. economy has lost 7.4 million jobs and unemployment has increased 4.8%).
As of August 2009, 14.9 million people were unemployed in the U.S., and the unemployment
rate was 9.7%. Id. at I.
9 See Press Release, Gross Domestic Product: Second Quarter 2009 (Second Estimate),
Corporate Profits: Second Quarter 2009 (Preliminary Estimate), Bureau of Econ. Analysis,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, August 27, 2009, available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/na-
tional/gdp/loo9/pdf/gdp2qo9_2nd.pdf (stating that real U.S. GDP contracted at a rate of I%
in the second quarter of 2009); Press Release, Gross Domestic Product: First Quarter 2009
(Final), Corporate Profits: First Quarter 2009 (Revised), Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't
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not seen in a generations. In order to combat this unprecedented economic
instability, Chairman Bernanke and Secretary Paulson urged the Congress
to grant the secretary of the treasury the money and authority needed
to stabilize the U.S. economy.10 After considerable division between the
political parties and houses of Congress-including the initial failure of
the first draft of the legislation in the House of Representatives' -the
legislative branch responded to the chairman and secretary's prodding by
enacting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA" or
"the Act").'I
The EESA's fundamental purpose is "to immediately provide authority
and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity
and stability to the financial system of the United States."'3 Among the
provisions of the Act, the secretary of the treasury is granted authority to
directly purchase troubled assets from financial institutions, 4 establish
programs for limiting executive pay,'5 coordinate with foreign authorities
to establish similar programs abroad, 16 proceed "in a manner that will
minimize any potential long-term negative impact on the taxpayer," 7 and
stabilize the economy by controlling up to $700 billion.'8 These authorities
fall under Title I of the Act, commonly known as the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP).' 9
The enormity of Congress's appropriation under the TARP cannot be
overemphasized. The $700 billion controlled by the Treasury under the
of Commerce, June 25, 2009, available at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2oo9/
pdf/gdpIo9f.pdf (stating that real U.S. GDP contracted at a rate of 5.5% in the first quar-
ter of 2009); Press Release, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Final), Corporate
Profits: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Final), Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
March 26, 2009, available at http:/lwww.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2oo9/pdf/gdp 4 o8f.
pdf (stating that real U.S. GDP contracted at a rate of 6.3% in the fourth quarter of 2008);
Press Release, Gross Domestic Product: Third Quarter 2008 (Final), Corporate Profits: Third
Quarter 2009 (Final), Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Dec. 23, 2008, avail-
able at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2oo8/pdf/gdp3o8f.pdf (stating that real
U.S. GDP contracted at a rate of 0.5% in the third quarter of 2oo8).
Io See The Economic Outlook, supra note 3; Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 4.
it See While Wall Street Burns, ThE ECONOMIST, Oct. 4-10, 2008, at 30, 30 (stating that the
House of Representatives rejected the first draft of the Act on September 29, 2008, by a vote
of 228 to 205).
12 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201-5261 (West Supp. 2009).
13 Id. § 52o1(1).
14 Id. § 5211(a)(l).
15 Id. § 522I; see Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Czar to Slash Compensation,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at AI (detailing the Treasury's plan to cut executive compensation
by an average of 9o% at firms receiving TARP funds).
16 12 U.S.C.A. § 5222.
17 Id. § 5223(a)(i).
18 Id. § 5225(a)(3).
i9 Id. § 52I1-5241.
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program is more than the individual gross domestic products of all but
twenty countries around the world. 0 Within the EESA, entities receiving
federal TARP funds must comply with multiple conditions in order to
remain eligible to receive funds.2" One prominent condition, thoroughly
studied in the following text, requires any entity receiving TARP funds to
forego a range of judicial actions against the secretary of the treasury.2 2 In
12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3), the Act states:
No action or claims may be brought against the Secretary [of the Treasury]
by any person that divests it assets with respect to its participation in a
program under this Act, except as provided in [the judicial review provisions
of Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 7 of Title 5, United States Code],
other than as expressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary. 3
The goal of this Note is to examine the limited-judicial-action condition in
exchange for TARP funds and determine its constitutionality. As such, this
Note is concerned exclusively with Congress's ability to condition federal
funds and restrictions placed on that power.
No case has been more important in the area of conditioned federal
spending than the Supreme Court decision in South Dakota v. Dole.14 In Dole,
the Court established a four-part test for determining the constitutionality
of congressionally-imposed conditions on federal funds.2" This test will
be described and applied in the following pages in order to determine the
constitutionality of the limited-judicial-action condition.
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part I first describes
the basics of Congress's Article I Spending Power. This section then details
Dole and explains the four-part test developed by the Supreme Court.
Part II further supports and then applies the Dole test to the limited-
judicial-action condition in the EESA. This section concludes that the
condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) is unconstitutional because it fails
to meet the fourth requirement of Dole. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of
the Constitution, the Exceptions and Regulations Clause, independently
20 CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK-COUNTRY COMPARISON :: NATIONAL PRODUCT, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/zooirank.html (listing 2oo8
GDP estimates for the 228 countries around the world).
21 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 522 1 (receiving money from a program in the Act requires recip-
ients to "meet appropriate standards for executive compensation and corporate governance"
as established by the secretary of the treasury).
22 See id. § 5229.
23 Id. § 5229(a)(3).
24 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
25 Compare id. at 207-08 (stating the majority's formulation of the Dok four-part test),
with id. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (summarizing the majority's four-part test into a
concise set of distinctive points that are somewhat easier to understand than the majority's
formulation).
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bars the limited-judicial-action condition because only Congress is vested
with the constitutional power to determine the jurisdiction of, and by
implication, access to, the Article III court system. The express language
of the Constitution prohibits the secretary of the treasury from having the
authority to determine when and under what circumstances a claim can be
brought against his or her office. Finally, the Note provides a summary of
my findings and conclusions.
This Note's goal is not to declare the entire EESA unconstitutional.
Rather, the goal is to examine a single condition on federal funds in the Act,
explain why it violates the Constitution, and show that it fails to overcome
well-established precedents in this area.
I. SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE AND THE FEDERAL SPENDING POWER-A PILLAR OF
FIRE IN THE WILDERNESS OF CONDITIONED FEDERAL SPENDING
South Dakota v. Dole clarified the Supreme Court's position on
conditioned federal spending. 16 Subsequent to the decision, conditions
on federal funds are constitutional as long as they meet the requirements
of the four-part test developed in the opinion. The test created by the
Court established guideposts that Congress must follow in order for future
spending conditions to be constitutional. Although Dole is the seminal case
in this area, it would be meaningless if Congress was not first vested with
the power to spend. Before the specific provisions of Dole are applied to the
limited-judicial-action condition in the EESA, this Note first establishes
Congress's power to spend tax revenues.
A. Defining Congress's Power to Spend
The Constitution contains four broad provisions conveying taxation
powers to Congress. 7 In spite of this fact, the Constitution never once
expressly uses the word "spend" to define Congress's ability to disburse tax
revenues."8 Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, however,
26 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-09.
27 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respec-
tive Numbers"); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. i ("The Congress shall have the Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States..."); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cis. 4-5 ("No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein be-
fore directed to be taken. No Tax or Duty shall be lad on Articles exported from any State.");
U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without
regard to any census or enumeration.").
28 Butsee U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 (enumerating specific areas in which Congress can create
legislation authorizing the expenditure of tax revenues); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (providing
2oo9 - 20101o
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vests Congress with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." 9 This section has been interpreted
to vest Congress with a general spending power because Congress would
be powerless to accomplish the goals for which it collects taxes "unless the
power to appropriate is as broad as the power to tax."3
The leading interpretation ofArticle I, Section 8, Clause 1 and Congress's
power to spend is found in United States v. Butler.3 Although the case turns
on an interpretation of the Tenth Amendment that is no longer valid,3" the
Supreme Court's opinion regarding Congress's power to spend is still good
law and widely accepted today.33
The main issue in Butlerconcerned Congress's ability to spend federally
collected tax revenues.m The Court concluded that the Constitution's
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 phrase "to provide . . . for the general
Welfare" 35 is itself an enumerated power and does not merely serve as the
conduit through which the other enumerated powers36 are to be achieved. 37
Discussing the two opposing views, the Court explained, "[James] Madison
asserted [the phrase 'for the general welfare'] amounted to no more than a
reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the
that Congress can only withdraw money from the Treasury "in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law").
29 U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. i.
30 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 65 (1936).
31 Butler, 297 U.S.i. Buter addressed the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933. Id. at 53. The Court held because the Constitution does not grant Congress an
enumerated power to regulate agriculture, any legislation created by Congress for that pur-
pose is prohibited by the Tenth Amendment and regulation of agriculture is reserved to the
states by that Amendment. Id. at 68.
32 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has dynamically
changed since Butler, and it no longer retains the force that it held when Butler was decided.
As stated by Justice Stone in U.S. v. Darby:
The [Ioth A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments as it has been established by the
Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to
allay the fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise
fully their reserved powers.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 1oo, 124 (1941).
33 United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216-1 7 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34 Butler, 297 U.S. at 62.
35 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
36 See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cIS. 2-18.
37 Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
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same section. '38 On the other hand:
[Alexander] Hamilton ... maintained the clause confers a power separate
and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the
grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax
and appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised
to provide for the general welfare of the United States. 9
Adopting the Hamiltonian view of the spending power, the Court ruled,
"[Tihe power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power
found in the Constitution."' In other words, Congress's spending authority
embraces situations not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. So
long as Congress can show that expenditures are for the general welfare, the
expenditures do not have to fall explicitly within one of the enumerated
powers.4
1
B. Restricting Congress's Ability to Place Conditions on Federal Funds
Building upon Congress's broad authority to spend, this Note next
examines Congress's ability to place conditions on the receipt of federal
funds. Generally, Congress can "attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy
objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance
by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.'
41
Although it is widely accepted that Congress can place conditions on
federal money, the power to do so does not inherently make every condition
constitutional.43 South Dakota v. Dole substantiates this view by providing
guidance for determining when a condition placed on federal funds is
constitutional.
The controversy in Dole arose when a South Dakota law permitted
people between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one to buy beer. 4 This
38 Idat 65.
39 Idat 65-66.
40 Id at 66.
4 But see, e.g., id. at 69 (quoting Linder v. United States, z68 U.S. 5, 17 (1925)) ("Congress
cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of
objects not intrusted [sic] to the federal government.").
42 United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2o6 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 474 (I98o)).
43 See id. at 207 ("The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead subject
to several general restrictions articulated in our cases." (internal citation omitted)).
44 Id. at 205.
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state law conflicted with a federal statute' requiring "the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds, otherwise
allocable, from States in which the purchase or public possession of any
alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is
lawful." 6 In the language of conditional spending, South Dakota's receipt
of federal highway funds was conditioned on the state having a twenty-
one-year-old drinking age.47 If it did not comply with the condition, South
Dakota would not receive the highway money provided by the federal
program.48
South Dakota challenged the condition placed on the transportation
funds. It argued that the condition in the statute violated both the
constitutional limit on Congress's spending power and the Twenty-first
Amendment.49 The Supreme Court declined to consider the Twenty-
first Amendment argument because it held that the condition was "within
constitutional bounds even if Congress may not regulate drinking ages
directly." 0
Refusing to find the condition unconstitutional, the Court acknowledged
that "[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited."', Congress is not
free to attach any and every condition to funds.5 2 The Court confirmed this
limitation on the conditional spending power by developing a four-part test
for determining the constitutionality of conditioned federal funds.
Part one of the test sustains the Hamiltonian view of congressional
spending developed in Butler. It mandates that "the exercise of the
spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare"' in order to be
constitutional.5 3 Part two requires any condition Congress places on federal
funds to be unambiguous within the statutory text.' The entity receiving
the funds must be able to "'exercise [its] choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences of [its] participation [in the federal program].' ' '5  Part
three cautions that "conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if
they are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or
45 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. III, 1982) (amended 1998).




50 Id. at 2o6.
51 Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13
(1981)).
52 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13 (1981) ("There are limits on the power of Congress
to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its spending power.").
53 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
54 Id.
55 Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
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programs."'' 6 Finally, part four ensures that a condition is not prohibited
by "an independent [constitutional] bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds."57
The Supreme Court held that the controversial condition in Dole was
constitutional because it did not violate the four-part test. Under part one,
the Court held, "[T]he provision is designed to serve the general welfare
... [because] Congress found that the differing drinking ages in the States
created particular incentives for young persons to combine their desire to
drink with their ability to drive, and that this interstate problem required
a national solution."5 18 The condition also passed part two because it was
unambiguous in the legislative text and "could not be more clearly stated
by Congress."5 9 The Court found part three satisfied because the condition
was "directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds
are expended-safe interstate travel."60  The condition-a mandatory
drinking age of twenty-one-was sufficiently related to the purpose of the
federal spending61 and, as such, avoided violating the Constitution.
Finally, the Court held part four was not violated because the condition
was not barred by an independent constitutional provision.6 The condition
did not violate the Twenty-first Amendment because the power to condition
funds would be subject to an independent constitutional bar only where
the conditioning power was used "to induce the [recipient of federal funds]
to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. ' 63 The
"independent constitutional bar" doctrine "is not ... a prohibition on the
indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to
achieve directly," which would have been the case had the Court accepted
South Dakota's Twenty-first Amendment argument. 64 Congress, which
could not directly regulate intra-state alcohol sales to individuals younger
than twenty-one, 65 was not barred from creating a uniform drinking age by
conditioning the receipt of federal highway funds on the establishment of
such an age restriction. 66
56 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).




6i Id. at 209. Contra id. at 212-18 (O'Conner, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the four-part
test developed in the case but dissenting because the condition was not "germane," or suf-
ficiently related, to the reason for the federal funding).
62 Id. at 209-10 (majority opinion).
63 Id. at 2lo.
64 Id.
65 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2 (reserving power to the states to regulate the trans-
portation or use of "intoxicating liquors" within state boundaries).
66 Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
200()- 20OLO]
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II. THE DOLE TEST APPLIED-IS THE LIMITED-JUDICIAL-ACTION
CONDITION CONSTITUTIONAL?
In 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3)-Limitations on Actions by Participating
Companies--Congress declared: "No action or claims may be brought
against the Secretary [of the Treasury] by any person that divests its assets
with respect to its participation in a program under this chapter, except as
provided in paragraph (1),67 other than as expressly provided in a written
contract with the Secretary."6  This statute conditions the receipt of
TARP funds on an entity's willingness to give up certain judicial claims
and specifically limits the types of actions that can be brought against the
secretary of the treasury. Upon a closer reading, it also vests the secretary
with the power to grant recipients individualized, actionable claims against
the secretary using private, written contracts.69
At its foundation, this conditional grant of TARP funds can be
understood in three distinct segments. First, and most restrictively, Congress
completely bars the doors to the judicial branch by prohibiting any entity
receiving TARP funds from bringing any claim against the secretary of the
treasury. "No action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any
person that divests its assets with respect to its participation in a program
under this chapter. ... "'o Second, Congress reopens the door to a specific
type of action. No actions "except as provided in [chapter 7 of title 5,
United States Code]" 71 may be brought against the secretary by companies
receiving TARP funds. Finally, and least restrictive of all, Congress leaves
unfettered discretion with the secretary of the treasury as to what other
actions may be brought against the secretary by companies participating
in the TARP. No suits may be brought against the secretary "other than as
expressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary."
z7
The last section of the 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) expands the authority
of the secretary of the treasury and allows him or her to act as gatekeeper
67 "Paragraph (i)," as referred to in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3), is 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(i),
which provides:
Actions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this chapter
shall be subject to chapter 7 of Title 5, United States Code, including
that such final actions shall be held unlawful and set aside if found to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with
law.
12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(I) (West Supp. 2009).
68 Id. § 5229(a)(3).
69 Id. ("No action or claims may be brought against the Secretary ... other than as ex-
pressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary.").
70 Id. (emphasis added).
71 Id.
72 Id. (emphasis added).
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to the Article III court system when allocating TARP funds. As a result
of this statute, the secretary is vested with the power to use private
contracts, at his or her discretion, to determine who does and does not
have access to a judicial remedy for injuries resulting from the secretary's
actions. This portion of the statute delegates congressional power to the
secretary to determine when the secretary can be sued, and this discretion
is virtually unchecked by other provisions of the TARP or by independent
authority.73
Now that the limited-judicial-action condition has been detailed, the
question remains whether the condition is constitutional. This question
can readily be answered by applying the four-part Dole test explained
above.74
A. Dole Part One: TARP Spending Isfor the General Welfare
As previously stated, when considering the constitutionality of a
condition placed on federal funds, one must first ask, "Is the spending for
the general welfare of the United States of America?"75 Any conditions
placed on the federal funds by Congress are not at issue when asking this
question. The specific type of condition (e.g., a minimum drinking age,
the relinquishment of certain judicial actions) is not important at this stage
in the analysis. Instead, before a court can address the constitutionality of
specific conditions, it must determine whether the funds being spent are
for the general welfare. If the court determines that Dole part one has been
violated (e.g., the federal spending is not for the general welfare) then it
73 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of zoo8, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 1z2 Stat.
3765, created several committees, boards, and panels to oversee the various powers and au-
thorities created by the legislation. A brief description of the four most important oversight
authorities follows. The Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOB) is charged with review-
ing exercises of authority under the Act and is to make recommendations to the Secretary
of the Treasury on how to use the authority granted to him or her by the Act. 12 U.S.C.A. §
5214 (West. Supp. 2009). Ironically, the Secretary of the Treasury is a member of the FSOB
and is thus responsible for reviewing exercises of his or her own authority. Id. § 5214(b)(Z).
Additionally, the Act obligates the Comptroller of the United States and Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) to conduct audits and review
appropriations of TARP funds. Id. §§ 5226(a)(1), 5231(c)(i). Finally, the main overseer of
authorities created by the Act is intended to be the five-member Congressional Oversight
Panel. Id. § 5233. Reports by this panel cover a wide variety of topics related to the legisla-
tion, including, but not limited to, a review of the authority exercised by the Secretary of the
Treasury, the impact on financial stability of purchases made under Act programs, and costs
and benefits of the programs to taxpayers. Id. § 5233(b)(I)(A). Each of these oversight panels
publishes regular reports concerning their areas of oversight. So far, however, the reports have
focused almost exclusively on specific expenditures of funds authorized by Act, and none
have addressed the Secretary's authority to make private contracts with TARP recipients con-
cerning their ability to sue the Secretary.
74 See supra Part I(B).
75 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
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can declare the entire program unconstitutional without considering the
constitutionality of a specific condition. Before considering the specifics of
the limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3), this Note
must consider whether the $700 billion appropriated under the EESA's
provisions is for the "general welfare."
The case of Helvering v. Davis76 provides guidance for determining
whether a spending program is for the general welfare and complies with
part one of Dole. In Davis, the Supreme Court was tasked with, among other
things, determining the constitutionality of a tax imposed on employers and
employees under Title II of the Social Security Act 77 to provide for Federal
Old-Age Benefits. 78 Holding the Social Security provision constitutional,
the Court acknowledged that difficulties arise when determining whether
spending is for the general welfare because "[tihe line must still be drawn
between one welfare and another .... Where this shall be placed cannot be
known through a formula in advance of the event. '79 The Court followed
the Hamiltonian view of broad congressional spending power and found that
discretion in federal spending "is not confided to the courts. The discretion
belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong or a display of arbitrary
power rather than an exercise of judgment."80 Furthermore, when a party
comes before the Court arguing that a congressional spending program is
not for the general welfare, he or she bears the overwhelming burden of
"showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged legislation fall
within the wide range of discretion permitted to the Congress."8" Overall,
"[in considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment
of Congress."82
In light of the language in Davis, no foreseeable argument could show
that the spending authorized in the EESA is not for the general welfare. As
one commentator has put it, this requirement is "lower than a speed bump,"8 3
and the Act is more than clear that the programs established under it are for
the benefit of the United States as a whole. The broad purpose of the Act
is "to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United
76 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 ('937).
77 Id. at 634.
78 Id. at 635.
79 Id. at 640.
8o Id.
81 Id. at 641 (emphasis added) (quoting Untied States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936)).
82 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 20 7 (t987) (citing Helvering, 3oi U.S. at 640, 645);
accordBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) ("It is for Congress to decide which expenditures
will promote the general welfare....").
83 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 5.7 (4th ed. 2007).
[Vol. 98
ROLL UP THE CONSTITUTION
States." 4 More specifically, spending under the EESA is to protect savings
and retirement accounts,8s keep citizens employed and in their homes,
86
and ensure that taxpayer money is not squandered.8 ' No one could argue
that these mandates are limited to a specific portion of U.S. society or that
their benefits are concentrated in certain people or regions of the country.S
Appropriations by the secretary, which have been authorized by Congress,
are not "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power... [nor] an exercise of
judgment."'89 Congress's use of language in the legislation shows that the
federal funds are to be utilized to solve the nationwide economic crisis.
Drawing on the language in Davis, it is clear that the Act is intended to
address a problem that is "plainly national in area and dimensions." 9 It can
confidently be said that the spending authorized under the EESA is "for
the general welfare" and passes the first requirement of Dole.
B. Dole Part Two: The Limited-judicial-action Condition Is Unambiguous
The second element of the Dole test specifically addresses the
constitutionality of conditions placed on federal money by Congress. Dole
part two requires conditions placed on funds to be unambiguous within
the statutory text of the spending program. 91 The next section of this Note
seeks to determine whether the condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3)-the
required relinquishment of certain judicial actions in exchange for federal
TARP funds-is unambiguous in the legislative text.
Pennhurst v. Halderman" offers the Supreme Court's interpretation
of what constitutes an unambiguous condition on federal spending. In
Pennhurst, the Court had to determine whether a congressional finding of
rights for the developmentally disabled persons 93 "imposed an obligation
on the States to spend state money to fund certain rights as a condition
84 12 U.S.C.A. § 520(l) (West Supp. 2009).
85 Id. § 5201(2)(A).
86 Id. § 52o(2)(B).
87 Id. § 5201(2)(C).
88 See Subsidyscope-Financial Bailout: Mapping Geographic Impact of the Trouble
Asset Relief Program, http://subsidyscope.com/bailout/tarp/map (last visited Jan. z, 2009)
(providing an excellent visualization of county-by-county distribution of TARP funds across
the nation).
89 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
90 Id. at 644.
91 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 17 (1981)).
92 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at i.
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 6oio (Supp. III 1976) (codifying congressional findings respecting the
rights of the developmentally disabled), omitted by Developmental Disabilities Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-527,98 Stat. 2662, 2669 (1984); see also 42 U.S.C § 15009 (2oo6) (codifying con-
gressional findings regarding the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities).
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of receiving federal moneys under the Act or whether it spoke merely in
precatory terms." 94 The fundamental question addressed was whether
states were required, as a condition of receiving federal money, to spend
their own funds in creating "substantive rights to 'appropriate treatment' in
the 'least restrictive' environment" for mentally handicapped individuals.9"
The Court held that no such condition was created by the federal statute
because the statutory language "[did] no more than express a congressional
preference for certain kinds of treatment. It [was] simply a general
statement of 'findings' and, as such, [was] too thin a reed to support the
rights and obligations read into it by the court below." 96 The language
of the statute was simply too ambiguous to create a condition because
"[n]oticeably absent from [the statute] [was] any language suggesting that
[it] is a 'condition' for the receipt of federal funding under the Act."97
The rule arising from Pennhurst cautions Congress that when it wishes
to condition federal money, it "must express clearly its intent to impose
conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the [recipient] can knowingly
decide whether or not to accept those funds" based on the obligations
created by the attached conditions. 98  Conditioned federal spending
essentially creates a "contract" between Congress and the recipient,19 and
whether or not the condition is constitutional depends on "whether the
[recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms." ' There can be
"no knowing acceptance if the [recipient] is unaware of the conditions or is
unable to ascertain what is expected of it" from the text of the statute. 0° In
summary, conditions on federal funds must be stated in the statutory text
so that there is no doubt that a condition is actually created. Based solely
on the language, the recipient must be able to make an "informed choice"
as to whether it will take the money as conditioned or reject the funds
altogether. 02
Examining the language in 12 U.S.C.A § 5229(a)(3) through the lens
of Pennhurst, the limited-judicial-action condition imposed on recipients
of TARP funds is unambiguous and passes the second part of Dole. The
language of the statute reads, "No action or claims may be brought against
the Secretary [of the Treasury] by any person that divests its assets with
respect to its participation in a program under this chapter, except as" in
94 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18.
95 Id. at io.
96 Id. at 19.
97 Id. at 13.
98 Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 17.
ioo Id. (emphasis added).
ioi Id.
i02 Id. at 25.
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the two manners specified.'03 The statute could not more plainly state
that any entity receiving federal money under the Act is prohibited from
bringing suit against the Secretary unless its claim arises under chapter 7 of
title 5, United States Code, or is expressly provided for in a written contact
with the Secretary.'°4 Thus, the condition passes the second part of the
Dole test because Congress has spoken "with a clear voice" regarding the
condition in the Act. 1 0s Entities applying for and receiving TARP money
can make an "informed choice" about whether to take the federal funds as
conditioned. Either they take it "knowingly and voluntarily," aware of the
limited-judicial-action condition in the statute, or they reject the condition
and forego receiving the money entirely.
1. Does the Unambiguous Condition Rise to the Level of Coercion?- Before
considering the remaining parts of the Dole test, one important caveat to
the unambiguous condition requirement must be addressed. The Supreme
Court and some academics' °6 have attempted to ameliorate the reoccurring
concern that a condition on federal money can be unambiguous and
unconstitutional. This occurs when Congress uses an unambiguous
condition as a means of coercing a recipient of federal funds to conform
to its will. A recipient of federal funds is coerced when it "is given no
choice, except a choice between the rock and the whirlpool-an option
to forego a privilege which may be vital to [its] livelihood or submit to a
requirement which may constitute an intolerable burden."'0 7 TARP funds
used to ensure financial viability could be considered "vital [to an entity's]
livelihood" and removing the right to sue the secretary of the treasury is
arguably "an intolerable burden."
In Dole, the Court summarily addressed the "condition-versus-coercion"
question and, in passing, cautioned that "in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' ' 08 Addressing this
concern, the Dole Court found that the condition requiring states to have
a uniform drinking age in order to receive federal highway funds was not
coercive.' 9 The federal statute provided that noncompliant states would
only lose five percent of the allotted highway funds for not participating in
103 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) (West Supp. 2009).
104 Id.
1o5 See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
io6 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 12-30 (2001); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions,
io2 H.av. L. REV. 1415, 1428-57 (1989).
107 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
io8 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301




the congressional mandate to create a uniform drinking age." ° According
to the Court, the condition was not coercive because "Congress has offered
relatively mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking
ages than they would otherwise choose."'' Because the states would
only lose a small portion of the total funds for choosing not to comply, the
Court found that the condition did not rise to the level of compulsion or
coercion."' The Dole majority left the impression that a condition is not
coercive as long as it provides "mild encouragement" for compliance with
the federal scheme. 13
The "mild encouragement" method of the coercive conditions doctrine
is not the only formulation that can be used to decide when the burden
imposed by a condition becomes coercive. Some academics argue that
a condition is only "coercive in the constitutional sense if withholding
the benefit offered ... would be unconstitutional.""' 4 This view of the
"condition-versus-coercion" dichotomy operates on the opposite end of
the spectrum and would have allowed Congress to withhold all federal
highway funding in Dole if South Dakota did not comply with the condition.
The thinking is as follows: the Constitution does not command or require
Congress to give federal highway funds to the states, and, as such, Congress
should be able to create conditions upon which funds are accepted. This
"greater includes the lesser" understanding of "condition-versus-coercion"
means "[i]f [Congress] can withhold the benefit entirely, the [recipient]
cannot be worse off by receiving the benefit conditionally; and if the
conditional offer cannot make her worse off, then nor can it plausibly
violate her constitutional rights.""' 5
So, on what side of the line does the limited-judicial-action condition
in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) fall? Is it still unconstitutional coercion by
Congress despite having been determined to be unambiguous? This is
a developing area in conditional spending jurisprudence, and a detailed
analysis of this question is outside of the scope of this Note. Suffice it to
say, it is unlikely that the condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) rises to the
level of coercion. Although the limited-judicial-action condition appears
to be more than "mild encouragement" by Congress-a financial institution
receives no TARP funds if it does not submit to the condition-it still fails
to reach the level of congressional coercion and can easily be distinguished
from the condition at issue in Dole.
Dole concerned a condition on federal funds apportioned to states for
1io Id.
i Id. (emphasis added).
112 Id. at21Z-12.
113 Id.
114 Berman, supra note io6, at 18 (summarizing the "greater includes the lesser"
understanding of condition versus coercion).
115 Id.
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the construction of highways.1 6 Section 5229(a)(3) concerns a condition
on federal funds allotted to private entities for the protection of the
U.S. financial system."7 Comparatively, the federal government takes
on considerably more risk when dealing with private individuals rather
than states, and it is natural that restrictions established by the condition
should be commensurate with the risks taken by Congress in spending tax
dollars.' I ' At a conclusory level, it appears that as long as the condition does
not require a private entity to violate a specific constitutional provision, the
Supreme Court will not determine that a conditional grant of federal funds
to private entities is coercive.
C. Dole Part Three: Limited-judicial-action Condition Is Sufficiently Related to
the Purpose of the EESA
Spending under the EESA is for the general welfare, and the limited-
judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) is unambiguous.
Despite these facts, the condition can still be unconstitutional if it does
not comply with Dole part three. The third part of Dole demands that any
condition placed on federal funds by Congress be reasonably related, or
germane, to the reason for the expenditure." 9 If the condition and the
overall expenditure are not sufficiently related, the condition will be
unconstitutional despite passing the other portions of the test.
The Dole majority concluded that the condition on the federal highway
funds was sufficiently related to the reason for its expenditurelZO Federal
116 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987) ("In 1984, Congress enacted [the
statute in dispute] which directs the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of
federal highway funds otherwise allocable from States 'in which the purchase or public pos-
session ... of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is
lawful."').
I17 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West. Supp. 2009) (stating that the purpose of the EESA is
to give the secretary of the treasury "authority and facilities" to stabilize the "financial system
of the United States).
118 Although disagreement will arise over this statement, a brief look at Treasury TARP
Transaction reports proves that the federal government has taken on an overwhelming finan-
cial risk by directly dealing with private businesses under EESA programs, especially the
TARP. As of September 2008, the Treasury had allocated TARP funds to 661 financial institu-
tions. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
'IANSACTION REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING AUGUST z6, zoo9 (Zoo9), http://www.financialstabil-
ity.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transactions-report-o8z8zoo9.pdf. The Treasury's monetary
allotment to financial institutions alone amounts to more than $2oo billion dollars, although
more than $7o billion of that amount has been repaid to the Treasury. Id. at 14. While some
institutions have been able to repay their TARP funds, others have failed to even pay the
quarterly dividends to the Treasury as required by TARP, which further evidences the risks
born by the federal government when dealing with private institutions. See Pallavi Gogoi &
Paul Wiseman, Some Banks Don't Repay TARP Dividend, USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2009, at B I.
I 19 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
120 Id. at 209.
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money is appropriated toward highway programs in order to provide safe
interstate travel.' Differing minimum drinking ages among the states
incentivizes young people to drink and drive on the interstate highway
system."2 To solve this problem, "Congress conditioned the receipt of
federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address this particular
impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended."'2 3
Dissenting in Dole, Justice O'Conner disagreed with the majority's
decision on the relatedness requirement for two reasons. First, she found
the condition "far too over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive
because it stops teenagers from drinking even when they are not about
to drive on interstate highways. It is under-inclusive because teenagers
pose only a small part of the drunken driving problem in this Nation."'1 4
Second, Justice O'Conner found the condition unrelated to the purposes
of the federal expenditure, and thus unconstitutional, because it was not
a condition but rather a regulation in an area in which Congress has no
regulatory power. 25 In her dissent, Justice O'Conner wrote that Congress
cannot "impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how
the money should be spent. A requirement that is not such a specification
is not a condition, but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within
one of Congress' delegated regulatory powers."2 6 Under this construction,
the condition in controversy was not a "condition determining how
federal highway money shall be expended," but was instead "a regulation
determining who shall be able to drink liquor."'2 7 Justice O'Conner was
firm in stating that the "establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21
is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose."2 8
The limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) is
constitutional under both the majority and dissenting view of the Dole
relatedness requirement. The condition is sufficiently related to the
purposes of the EESA, is not too over- or under-inclusive, and is part of a
field that the Constitution expressly allows Congress to regulate.
First, using the Dole majority's approach, Congress has "conditioned
the receipt of federal funds in a way reasonably calculated to address [a]
particular impediment to a purpose for which the funds are expended."'' 2 9
Section 5201(1) states that one of the overarching purposes of the Act is to
i 21 Id. at zo8.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 209.
124 Id. at 214-15 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 216.
1z6 Id.
127 Id. at 218.
128 Id. at 213-14.
129 Id. at 209 (majority opinion).
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"immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary oftheTreasury
can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United
States." 130 As explained above, the U.S. currently faces an unprecedented
financial and economic crisis, and Congress has moved quickly to combat
it. In doing so, Congress included the limited-judicial-action condition in
12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) to protect the secretary's expanded authority and
power under the Act. The condition prevents the secretary from being sued
for exercising the power given to him by Congress under the Act in all cases
except where the secretary acts in a manner that is "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law." 131 The condition
immunizes the secretary from suit in most circumstances and allows him or
her to act quickly without fear of judicial recourse, which is consistent with
the purposes of the Act. Congress likely chose to immunize the secretary
in this way because the authority granted under the EESA is limited to two
years, 13 unless the secretary requests Congress extend it.133 If the secretary
could be sued during this brief period, it would substantially hamper his
power to act with the immediacy mandated by Congress in other parts of
the legislation. The limited-judicial-action condition was included to
promote immediate action by the secretary, a primary purpose of the Act,
and, as such, the condition is germane to the expenditure.
Second, unlike the disputed condition in Dole, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3)
is not over- or under- inclusive. In her dissenting opinion in Dole, Justice
O'Conner found that the condition mandating a drinking age of twenty-
one prevented persons under that age, who were not going to drive, from
drinking altogether and failed to prevent people older than twenty-one from
drinking and driving.1- In the present legislation, the limited-judicial-
action condition aims only at entities receiving TARP funds. "No action
or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any person that divests its
assets with respect to its participation in a program under this chapter... ." , 13 The
condition directly targets the specific group to which it is addressed. In this
sense, the condition is perfectly inclusive.
Finally, unlike Justice O'Conner's categorization of the drinking-age
condition in Dole, the limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. §
5229(a)(3) is sufficiently related to the purposes of the Act because Congress
has the power to regulate the field associated with the condition. Article
130 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201(1) (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
131 See id. § 5229(a)(1).
132 See id. § 523o(a).
133 See id. (giving Congress the option to extend the authority given to the secretary by
EESA after the secretary provides a "justification of why the extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets, as well as the expected cost to the taxpayers
for such an extension").
134 Dole, 483 U.S. at 214-15 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
135 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) (emphasis added).
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III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution states, "In all other Cases... the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."'13 6
Congress has exercised its exceptions and regulations power to promulgate
the condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3).
Although the next section of this Note argues that the Exceptions
and Regulations Clause acts as an independent constitutional bar to the
limited-judicial-action condition for an alternative reason, it is sufficient
for the moment to state that the condition is reasonably related to the
provision of the Act. Even if it has acted improperly, Congress has the
power to determine who can seek redress in the Article III court system,
and it has exercised this power by creating the condition in 12 U.S.C.A. §
5229(a)(3).
D. Dole Part Four: The Limited-judicial-action Condition Is Barred by an
Independent Constitutional Provision
The limited-judicial-action condition in the EESA complies with the
first three parts of the Dole test. Appropriations under the Act are for the
general welfare, 37 the specific condition considered is unambiguous, 38 and
it is reasonably related to the reason for the federal expenditure. 3 9 To be
constitutional, though, the limited-judicial-action condition must also pass
the fourth part of Dole- conditions imposed on federal funds by Congress
must not contravene provisions of the Constitution that are independent of
the spending power.110
The Supreme Court offered only limited guidance in Dole for
determining when a part four violation occurs. Examining a recipient's
actions as a result of a condition on federal funds, it summarily acknowledged
that "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds."' 4  The Court did not,
however, point out or describe any specific provisions having such force.
Focusing on Congress's use of the conditioning power, the majority said,
"[C]onstitutional limitations on Congress when exercising its spending
power are less exacting than those on its authority to regulate directly."'4
These statements show that the Court's independent constitutional bar
analysis has two distinct prongs.
In order for a condition on federal funds to be constitutional under
136 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
137 Seesupra Part IH(A).
138 See supra Part II(B).
139 See supra Part II().
140 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 2o8-i1 (1987).
141 Id. at 2o8.
142 Id. at 209.
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Dole part four, the recipient's actions as a result of the condition must not
violate the Constitution and Congress's use of the federal spending power
to condition funds must not contravene other constitutional provisions that
might restrain that power. This Note next examines the Court's Dole part
four analysis and applies the two prong test to both the recipient's actions
resulting from 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3), and the congressional exercise of
power in creating the condition. A violation of either prong would make
the limited-judicial-action condition unconstitutional.
1. TARP Recipients' Actions as a Result of the Limited-judiial-action Condition
Are Not Barred by the Constitution.-In independent constitutional bar cases,
the recipient's actions resulting from a condition on federal spending are
the first item considered. In these cases, "the power [to conditionally
grant federal funds] may not be used to induce the [recipient] to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." 43 When attempting
to enforce the independent constitutional bar doctrine on a spending
condition, one must find a constitutional provision which causes the
recipient's actions, induced by the condition, to be unconstitutional.
The Dole Court gave two examples of conditions which would cause
the recipient of federal funds to act contrary to the Constitution: "[A] grant
of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate
exercise of Congress' broad spending power."'144 The Constitution bars
such individual activities through the Fourteenth and Eight Amendments
respectively. a1 4 This does not mean all actions by a recipient resulting from
a condition on federal funding will violate the Constitution.
In UnitedStates v. American Library Association,146 the appellees asked the
Court to find the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) unconstitutional
because the statute imposed "an unconstitutional condition on libraries
that receive [subsidies to promote Internet access] by requiring them,
as a condition on their receipt of federal funds, to surrender their First
Amendment right to provide the public with access to constitutionally
protected speech." ' 47 The CIPA legislation conditioned the receipt of federal
funds used to provide Internet access on the libraries installing Internet-
143 Id. at 210.
144 Id. at 2IO-II.
145 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
146 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
147 Id. at 2l0.
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filtering software that would prevent pornographic and other explicit
materials from being viewed on library computers. 148 If the libraries did not
comply with CIPA, they would not receive financial support for providing
Internet access. 149 The Court found that the condition did not require the
libraries to violate the First Amendment because "when the Government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the
limits of that program."'' 10 Since the limits in CIPA were sufficiently broad,
"CIPA [did] not induce libraries to violate the [First Amendment of the]
Constitution, and [it] is a valid exercise of Congress' spending power." 15
Considering that the first prong of the independent constitutional
bar analysis focuses on a recipient's actions resulting from an attached
condition, this Note must determine whether the condition in 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5229(a)(3) requires a recipient of TARP funds to act in a way that violates
the Constitution.
The limited-judicial-action condition does not require a recipient to
take an affirmative action in violation of the Constitution. The condition
does not require action at all. Instead, it commands an omission in exchange
for the federal funds.' Recipients of TARP funds are barred from bringing
an action or claim against the secretary of the treasury except in the limited
manner provided unless they have a written contract with the secretary
allowing them to do so.5 3 Thus, looking solely at the behavior required
of a recipient under the condition, Dole part four is satisfied. There is no
constitutional provision which requires entities with perceived, alleged,
or even actual injuries to bring a judicial action to ameliorate the wrong.
Thus, the omission required by 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) does not cause the
recipient to act in a manner contrary to the Constitution, and the recipient's
actions pass the independent constitutional bar requirement of Dole part
four.
The recipient's actions under the independent constitutional bar
analysis are only half of the equation. To complete the analysis required by
Dole, the conditioning power exercised by Congress in creating 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5229(a)(3) must also not run afoul of or violate restrictions on the spending
power found in the Constitution.
2. Congress's Creation of the Limited-judicial-action Condition on TARP Funds
Is Barred by the Constitution.- As shown above, the first prong in the
independent constitutional bar analysis requires actions by the conditioned
recipient to be constitutional. Equally important in the analysis is the
148 Id. at 199.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 211.
151 Id. at 214.
152 See 1z U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) (West Supp. 2009).
153 Id.
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second prong of Dole part four, which requires Congress to exercise its
conditional spending power in a way that does not violate other parts of the
Constitution. To fully comply with Dole part four, Congress's creation of
the limited-judicial-action condition in the TARP must not be prohibited
by provisions of the Constitution that are independent of the power to
condition funds.
Unlike the first prong of Dole part four, which has some history regarding
when a recipient's actions would and would not violate the Constitution as
a result of a condition, the Supreme Court has only explored one section
of the Constitution in its second prong analysis. Referring to its opinion in
Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,'-' the Dole Court said, "[A] perceived
Tenth Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs did
not... limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants."'
' 55
In other words, Congress's ability "to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to states shall be disbursed" does not violate state sovereignty
protected by the Tenth Amendment. 5 6 The Tenth Amendment will not
act as an independent constitutional bar to congressional exercises of the
conditioning power because the independent constitutional bar doctrine
"is not ... a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which
Congress is not empowered to achieve directly."'
157
Since the Tenth Amendment only relates to the federal government's
interaction with state governments, and because it has been held that it
does not impose a limit on Congress's conditional spending power, this
Note must look to other provisions of the Constitution for an independent
constitutional bar to the limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. §
5229(a)(3).
As asserted at the beginning, this Note's principle argument is that
the limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) is
independently barred by the Exceptions and Regulations Clause found
in Article III of the Constitution. Broadly stated, Congress has used its
conditioning power to create a condition which directly conflicts with this
portion of the Constitution because the condition in 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 5229(a)(3) is an attempt by Congress to vest an executive branch
officer-the secretary of the treasury-with an exclusive legislative branch
power, resulting in a direct violation of the Constitution. The condition
in 12 U.S.C.A § 5229(a)(3) fails the second prong of Dole part four and is
unconstitutional because this particular exercise of the conditional spending
power is prohibited by a clear and independent constitutional bar.
The limited-judicial-action condition declares, "No action or claims
may be brought against the Secretary [of the Treasury] by any person that
154 Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (I947).
155 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).




divests its assets with respect to its participation in a program under this
chapter, except as provided in [chapter 7 of Title 5, United States Code],
other than as expressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary.' ' 58 The
requirements of Dole are satisfied and the condition is constitutional until
the point at which it vests the secretary of the treasury with the authority
to use written, private contracts to determine which TARP recipients are
able to seek judicial resolution against the secretary. The power vested in
the secretary by the condition allows him or her to violate the fundamental
legal principle that parties in similar situations should be treated similarly.
This portion of the EESA is constitutionally barred by the Exceptions
and Regulations Clause because the Constitution exclusively vests
Congress with the power to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.'59 Section 5229(a)(2) is a condition on TARP funds
which gives away this important congressional power to the secretary of
the treasury and must be declared unconstitutional. Article III, Section 2,
Clause 2-the Exceptions and Regulations Clause-states:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.' 60
The second sentence of this constitutional provision clearly states that only
Congress can make exceptions and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. 16' The last portion of 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3)
contravenes this congressional power and grants the secretary of the treasury
authority to make contracts with private entities to determine when a claim
can be brought against the secretary. 6 Effectively, the limited-judicial-
action condition allows the secretary of the treasury to make exceptions
and regulations to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without
oversight or review of his or her actions. This portion of the Act infringes on
congressional power and is an unconstitutional delegation of the exceptions
and regulations power vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution.
The non-delegation doctrine is a tenuous doctrine upon which to base
a legal argument because, since 1935, the Supreme Court has only found
158 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
159 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
16o Id. (emphasis added).
161 But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 173-79 (1803) (holding that the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court granted by Article III of the Constitution cannot
be altered by Congress but that the Exceptions and Regulations Clause allows Congress to
determine the appellate jurisdiction of the Court).
162 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3).
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an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power in two cases.' 6 This
Note, however, is not arguing for the full revival of the non-delegation
doctrine. Instead, portions of the doctrine should be incorporated into
the Supreme Court's Dole analysis of conditioned federal spending. Such
incorporation in the second prong of Dole part four would ensure that
delegations of constitutional power are not independently barred by other
constitutional provisions when conditioning the receipt of federal funds.
The unconstitutional delegation doctrine, thus incorporated into the Dole
analysis, would prevent Congress from using its conditional spending power
to give away its authority to unelected and non-representative entities like
the secretary of the treasury.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute'" provides three principled
reasons for incorporating the non-delegation doctrine into the second
prong of Dole part four. Explaining his reasons for supporting a forceful
non-delegation doctrine, Rehnquist said:
First .... [the non-delegation doctrine] ensures to the extent consistent with
orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy
are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive
to the popular will. Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent
Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides that recipient
of that authority with an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the
delegated discretion. Third .... the doctrine ensures that courts charged
with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able
to test that exercise against ascertainable standards.' 61
The three principles articulated by Rehnquist are clearly violated by the
limited-judicial-action condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3). First, power
conveyed to the secretary of the treasury through the condition allows the
secretary to pick and choose the time and manner he or she will be subject
to suit because of actions he or she has taken while administering TARP
funds. As such, this unconstitutional delegation takes a power previously
held by Congress-a power subject to responsive action by the populace
through elections-and gives it to the head of an executive agency, whom
is only accountable to the President. In this sense, the idea that Congress is
subject to the political will of the nation is defeated because the exceptions
and regulations power is delegated to the secretary of the treasury.
Second, Congress, in delegating the exceptions and regulations power
to the secretary, has not included an "intelligible principle" to guide the
163 See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,433 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495,541-42 (1935).
164 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1979).
165 Id. at 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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delegation. The Act simply allows the secretary of the treasury immunity
from any suit brought by a recipient of funds under the Act except "as
expressly provided in a written contract with the Secretary."16 Congress has
failed to provide any guidance as to when the secretary can use contracts to
give private entities access to the court system in order to sue the secretary.
As a result, the secretary has the power to establish his or her own rules
governing the formation of such contracts, and it is clear that the power
to decide who has access to the court system under the Act should not be
coupled with the power to decide when that power is applicable.
Third, Justice Rehnquist built upon the "intelligible principle" doctrine
and found that the establishment of such a principle in a constitutional
delegation of a congressional power would give the courts a standard by
which to judge the actions of the authority exercising the delegated power.
Again, Congress failed to give the secretary of the treasury any guidance in
the Act as to when the power to use contracts with private entities can open
the doors to the court system. Thus, it would be extremely difficult for a
court to judge the secretary's exercise of this delegated power.
Section 5229(a)(3) violates prong two of Dole part four and is
unconstitutional. The limited-judicial-action condition fails to meet the
three principles laid out by Justice Rehnquist in American Petroleum Institute
regarding when a delegation of congressional authority is constitutional,
and the Exceptions and Regulations Clause clearly bars the delegation of
power in the statute at issue. Thus, the power delegated to the secretary
of the treasury to use private contracts in order to determine when the
secretary can be sued should be changed by Congress or struck down by
the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The EESA of 2008 is one of the many tools the U.S. has used to combat
the current unprecedented economic crisis facing America. Within the Act,
Congress conditioned the use of an almost incomprehensible amount of
money in several ways, each governed by the four-part analysis developed
in South Dakota v. Dole.
Most importantly for the analysis conducted above, Congress, in 12
U.S.C.A § 5229(a)(3), created a condition which required recipients ofTARP
funds to relinquish certain judicial rights and claims against the secretary
of the treasury. This Note has shown that the condition is constitutional
under the first three Dole requirements. The expenditure of funds under
the Act is for the general welfare and the condition on the funds is both
unambiguous and reasonably related to the reason for the expenditure.
Additionally, the limited-judicial-action condition overcomes prong one
166 iz U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3).
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of Dole part four because it does not require the conditioned recipient to
violate the Constitution in order to receive TARP funds.
Congress, however, in establishing the condition, violated the second
prong of Dole part four by improperly exercising its conditional spending
power. Congress's actions under the Dole test make the condition in 12
U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) unconstitutional. The Exceptions and Regulations
Clause of the Constitution clearly and only vests Congress with the power
to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.' 67 The
condition in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5229(a)(3) unconstitutionally delegates this
power to the secretary of the treasury and allows him or her to use private
contracts to determine when a TARP recipient can access the Article III
court system and sue the secretary for actions he or she has taken under
the Act. Using the conditional spending power in a way that allows
Congress to delegate one of its most important powers to an unaccountable
executive branch officer violates the second prong of Dole part four and is
clearly unconstitutional. Although the EESA does not itself violate the
Constitution, the limited-judicial-action condition in the TARP is an
unconstitutional condition on federal funds and should be reformed in
order to comply with the four-part test developed in Dole.
167 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, ci. 2.
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